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Abstract 
This note makes the following two points based on Cournot utility functions of the legislators and on 
the government budget constraint viewed from the perspective of the equation of exchange. Without 
logrolling, i.e. with different perceptions of the budget constraint, there can be such a legislature 
preference structure that can turn a pork-barrel project into welfare-enhancing public expenditure 
depending on economic circumstances. With logrolling, i.e. with agreement at least regarding the size 
of the budget, the “pork” may be taken out of the project regardless the economic conjuncture. These 
results are independent of the utility function used, while the use of the quantity equation serves only as 
the simplest macroeconomic framework in which the two general points herein may be made. 
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The budget should be balanced, the Treasury should be refilled, public debt should be reduced, [and] 
the arrogance of officialdom should be tempered and controlled…lest Rome become bankrupt. − 
Marcus Tullius Cicero (106-43BC) 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Pork-barrel spending can arise even under a homogeneous electorate as a result of redistributive 
promises to gain political advantage and is a source of budget deficits, (Lizzeri 1999). The focus here is 
these deficits and to the extent pork-barrel spending demands are accommodated somehow, any 
aspirations for a balanced budget are doomed to fail, indeed, (see also Chari and Cole 1995, and 
Battaglini and Coate 2008). And, neither legislature size nor bicameralism is expected to reverse the 
subsequent debt accumulation and tax increase (see e.g. Ricciuti 2004). Unless, of course, pork-barrel 
spending happens to be conducive to growth (see e.g. Lanciay and Russoz 2013). In a Cournot type 
interaction between the advocator of such spending and a balanced budget proponent, a leader-follower 
rather than Nash equilibrium can be the case with or without logrolling. And, even if the leader is the 
thrifty delegate, some pork-barrel spending will always be authorized for reasons if not anything else of 
consensus politics. In principle, the spending conceded to by a balanced budget proponent will be less 
than the spending desired by a pork-barrel pleader. But, in practice, economic circumstances may end 
up facilitating the realization of the spending targeted by the latter. The next section shows that this 
depends on the interplay between legislator preferences and the macroeconomic conjuncture as 
described elementarily by quantity-of-theory-of-money considerations. This is the case when 
legislators hold different views of the government budget and refuse to compromise them by logrolling. 
A consensus about the budget constraint reached through the trading of votes to ensure maximum real 
output growth, takes the “pork” out of pork-barrel spending regardless the economic conjuncture. The 
third section concludes this discussion by pointing to the redistributive aspect of such spending. 
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2. The Analysis 
 
Let the supporter of pork-barrel spending and the thrifty delegate be designated by subscripts 1 and 2, 
respectively. Let  be the public expenditure at the price level , with , so that: 
 
and 
 
where denotes utility while the ’s, ’s, and ’s are some positive constants. Actor , derives 
utility from  but disutility from  The budget constraints contemplated are: 
 
and 
 
implying thereby that: 
 
where  is government borrowing and  is the one-period-change operator. For simplicity, the interest 
payments, , serving the debt are ignored, where  is the nominal interest. The first-order conditions 
from the corresponding Lagrangeans yield that: 
 
and  
 
where  are the Lagrangean multipliers, and  is the optimal value of  obtaining from the th 
Lagrangean. There is clearly no Nash equilibrium. There would be one iff: 
 
but, in general, we expect that: 
 
as outlined in the introductory section. This is the condition that preferences should satisfy at the 
optimum. It has to be complemented by one describing the economic environment that would make 
them sensible in practice. 
 
This second condition emerges by asking, how the above differentiation in the ’s reflect on (5)? One 
way to approach the difference is to resort to the equation of exchange: , where  is the 
velocity of the circulation of money and  is real output. From this equation: 
 
The balanced budget proponent would be one favoring price stability and in general,  when 
 in the short-run: 
 
But, the legislator advancing pork-barrel spending bills would not simply “bother” with such “details”: 
 
It follows that: 
 
This is the condition under which the reservations of the thrifty legislator would be sensible in practice, 
ceteris paribus, that is, given the preferences expressed in the relevant debate. It is a condition about 
price stability: price reductions/increases should be less than circulation velocity reductions/increases. 
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It is the condition about the economic environment in which the legislators debate and has to be 
combined with the earlier condition, , over preferences.  
 
The outcome of this combination may be found by equating  with , and  with , and 
obtaining: 
 
and 
 
with 
 
Combining  with  implies that  iff, of course, the denominator of  is as 
positive as the numerator. But, if this is not the case, if  and if 
 we will continue having , when the absolute value of the left-hand side of 
 exceeds that of the right-hand side. If not, it will imply that the pork-barrel spending under debate 
is actually growth-enhancing for the overall economy and should not be blocked by the thrifty delegate. 
Much more so when such spending induces government borrowing, and growth can help check the 
debt-to-output ratio. The same again holds if  but , and if 
both of these expressions were positive with the former exceeding absolutely the latter. It all depends 
on the interplay between these two expressions. The use of more complicated utility functions like the 
Cobb-Douglas or Stone-Geary ones would only complicate the expression describing the preferences, 
while the introduction of interest payments on debt would only turn in this expression  to . 
And, the use of more complicated expressions about , deriving perhaps from outside the context of 
the equation of exchange, would only modify the condition  regarding the economic conjuncture 
under which decisions are made. More interesting would be rather to see how the introduction of 
logrolling qualifies our basic conclusion. 
 
The trading among legislators of their votes on the different bills before an assembly is usually 
approached through its voting dimension (see e.g. Wilson 1969 and Tullock 1970). Here, logrolling 
takes the form that once player 2 realizes that some pork-barrel spending cannot be avoided, player 1 
might be convinced by 2 to claim such spending within the context of a balanced budget, i.e. to 
maximize (1) constrained by (4) rather than (3), so that the maximum under the circumstances growth, 
i.e. , may be ensured, where the prime ( ) connotes to this maximization problem. 
Alternatively, 1 might persuade 2 to maximize (2) subject to (3), to accommodate that is pork-barrel 
spending, promising a , that is that 1 will not hurt 2’s growth aspirations, where the prime 
refers to this now maximization problem. Such promises are possible because both agents acknowledge 
real output growth to be the principal component of any policymaking independently of the prevailing 
economic momentum, that is of the relationship between  and . As it may be seen from  and 
, the adoption of common budget constraints, eliminates from the calculations the relationship 
between prices and circulation velocity. The economic momentum does not matter anymore and only 
the conditions over preferences corresponding to the “primed” optimization problems remain 
significant in shaping konjunkturpolitik: 
 
and 
 
respectively. Trustworthy legislators can cooperate to the mutual and societal benefit to the extent that 
pork-barrel-spending induced debt accumulation cannot be avoided. 
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3. Concluding Remarks 
 
Two are the points made by this note, namely (i) that legislator preferences may adjust under any 
economic conjuncture to turn any pork-barrel spending to a growth- enhancing venture, and (ii) that 
logrolling may make this a lot easier. Pork-barrel projects are certainly redistributive ones and it is in 
the hands of politicians to be deliberating them under a stringent growth clause. A century ago, the 
Louisiana Senator Joseph E. Ransdell (1916) was writing: “In its general acceptation, ‘pork,’ as applied 
to Congressional legislation, means an appropriation by Congress for an unworthy purpose that is not 
for the public good and useful to the nation, but is for the private benefit of the Congressman who 
secures it, or for one or more of his constituents. The term conveys the idea that certain classes of 
legislation such as pensions, public buildings, rivers, and harbors, and some other bills, if not wholly 
reprehensible, contain many improper items for objects which should have no place in acts of 
Congress. These bills are made to appear similar to the parable of the sower who got the cockle mixed 
with his wheat. Their wise provisions which help the public and promote the general welfare constitute 
the wheat, and the selfish, unjust, and unwise items are the cockle, or ‘pork’”, (p. 43). And, the senator 
then asks for the removal of the cockle. This is what we do point out herein, too. Moreover, echoing 
“Director’s law” regarding redistributive politics, pork-barrel spending appears to favor the middle 
class, which is certainly growth-enhancing per se (Dixit and Londregan 1998), contingent, of course, 
upon the removal of the “cockle”.  
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